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Abstract In this article we briefly summarize how
converging technologies challenge elements of the
existing symbolic order, as shown in the contributions
to this special issue. We then identify the vision of ‘life
as a do it yourself kit’ as a common denominator in the
various forms of convergence and proceed to show how
this vision provokes unrest and debate about existing
moral frameworks and taboos. We conclude that, just as
the problems of the industrial revolution sparked off the
now broadly established ideal of sustainability
the converging technologies should be governed by
the ideal of ‘human sustainability’. The essence of this
ideal is formed by the ongoing discussion about the
extent to which we may, or should want to, ‘make’ our
environment and ourselves, and when it is better to
simply accept what is given and what happens to us.
Keywords Convergingtechnologies.Ethics.
Sustainability
Introduction
Stimulation of parts of one’s brain so that one’s
behaviour ‘fits in’ better, a material environment that
helps one conquer weakness of will, permanent
remote monitoring to guard one’s health and the
design and building of new forms of cellular life. This
is only a small selection from the preceding articles to
illustrate the varied nature of what is in store for us if
nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technol-
ogy and cognitive science (NBIC) converge with one
another.
It is not clear what will actually become possible
within the foreseeable future and what will remain
figments of our imagination [19, 20]. Nevertheless,
we must not consider the promise of converging
technologies as empty right from the start. Promises
and expectations have an effect, whether they are
realistic or not. They shape our contemporary
research agenda and, in doing so, the future [2]. It
is important that we examine whether the perspective
they offer is attractive or not. This normative
question is, however, just as difficult to answer.
Converging technologies are causing uncertainty as
regards the area of norms and values too [9, 15]. To
what extent can we, for instance, still hold people
responsible if our free will can be dismissed as an
illusion generated by our brains? (See Schermer, this
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function of our consciences, does that mean that a
part of our moral liability will also be delegated?
(See Verbeek, this issue.) Is a transparent body
indeed as desirable as many now think or, in 15
years’ time, shall we long for the time that we were
not constantly being confronted with our bodies?
(See Boenink, this issue.) And must patent legisla-
tion, once thought up for totally different matters, be
amended in the light of developments in synthetic
biology? (See Van den Belt, this issue.) New
problems require new solutions. Some parts of our
current ethical, legal and political convictions and
institutions will, therefore, probably evolve along
with science and technology. But how and in what
direction? Uncertainty reigns in the normative area
as well.
As the foregoing articles have exhaustively illus-
trated, in the case of NBIC convergence we are
dealing with a third level of uncertainty. The symbolic
order [6], the stock of twin concepts we use to
categorize our reality, faces numerous challenges
from scientific and technological developments. The
distinctions between human and machine, body and
mind, sick and well, freedom and responsibility,
organic life and inorganic matter are simply not as
obvious as they used to be. This confusion, which is
as fundamental as it is difficult to grasp, is working its
way to the surface in concrete ethical questions and
controversies. Technological innovations require the
re-assessment of symbolic concepts. [25] Table 1
briefly summarizes how the forms of NBIC conver-
gence handled earlier lead to the modification of the
symbolic order.
This is why we discuss the character of the
converging technologies and the fundamental chal-
lenge they present us with, generally speaking, in this
concluding article.
In section two we identify a common denominator
in the various forms of convergence that have been
dealt with in the separate articles of this special issue.
We argue that NBIC convergence is founded on an
underlying vision in which life is visualized as a do-
it-yourself kit, and that convergence actively pro-
motes this vision. This idea implies that we can also
take the world apart and rebuild it to our own taste.
Section three describes how this vision leads to unrest
and debate about existing moral frameworks and
taboos. Section four searches for a solution. Just as
the problems of the industrial revolution sparked
off the now broadly established ideal of sustainability
in the past, the new technological wave should allow
itself to be led by the ideal of ‘human sustainability’.
The essence of this ideal is formed by the ongoing
discussion about the extent to which we may, or
should want to, try to ‘make’ our environment and
ourselves, and when it is better to simply accept what
is given and what happens to us. Section five contains
a short conclusion.
Life as a do-it-yourself kit
Although technological convergence can take place
in extremely diverse fields and very different forms,
two characteristics are generally evident. First, a
process of computerization of reality always pre-
cedes convergence. In The Third Wave [27], Toffler
distinguishes between three successive technological
waves: the agricultural revolution, the industrial
revolution and the information revolution. Because
of the fundamental importance of the computeriza-
tion of reality for NBIC convergence, there is
something to be said for not calling this a separate
new technological wave, but simply a new phase in
the third technological wave. Second, there is also
the matter of the sweeping miniaturization of devices
that has been enabled by nanoscience and technology
The concrete effects of computerization and
miniaturization can vary enormously, as the previ-
ous articles have shown. Nonetheless, a common
denominator can be found in this diversity: the
convergence of technologies is generally inspired
by the hope of increasing the ‘makeability’ of the
organic world and of life itself [14, 22]. This may
not seem very shocking on the face of it. After all,
from the very beginning technology has focused on
control and influence, on moulding reality to suit
oneself. The intention of technologyis to makereality
makeable.Thatappliedtothediscoveryoffireandthe
needle and thread, and that applies now, too, to
syntheticorganismsandtobrain-computerinteraction
[16, 17, 30].
NBIC convergence intends to make large parts of
reality controllable. However, the articles in this
special issue show that there is also a more funda-
mental, qualitative change involved. Converging
technologies are founded on and complete a scientific
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philosophical paradigm shift. In order to make this
clear, the general concept of ‘technical makeability’
has to be further analysed because, in fact, so far we
have used this term for two fundamentally different
types of ‘making’.
1
Building with Non-Living Matter
The most literal use of the term ‘making’ is for the
manipulation of lifeless matter. In this case, making
means putting togetherthedesiredwhole fromseparate
materials and parts. For example, we first design a
houseandthenwemake itoutofbricks,cement,wood,
etc.; or we make a machine by arranging and
connecting nuts, bolts, chips and what not into a
functioning whole; or we make a garment by combin-
ing separate ‘building blocks’ such as fabric, thread
and buttons with the aid of instruments (needle and
scissors) inacertainway.Allthematerials weusetodo
so, including reinforced concrete, plastic and thread
can, inturn, also be made by humans. Thisismakingin
the sense of building. We associate ‘building’ with the
non-living, inorganic world.
Influencing Living Matter
We also re-make the world of organic, living nature —
with the aid of technology. In this way we hope to
make nature serve our purpose. We have already been
‘making’ new grain varieties and chicken breeds for
thousands of years. We keep people healthy by sharing
the latest scientific insights on healthy living with
them, or having them tested regularly for signs of
illness. We make patients a bit better, or cure them
altogether, by giving them medicine or equipping them
with an artefact or prosthesis. We make a person
morallybetterbyeducatinghimorherusing pedagogic
understanding. Every one of these cases involves
technical makeability. After all, they are all interven-
tions based on instrumental knowledge and/or the use
of technical instruments.
Nevertheless, it is immediately clear that the
breeding of plants and animals involves a totally
different type of ‘making’ than when we build a
house or machine. Plants and animals are neither
designed nor built. When we try to heal or educate a
person, we do not do so by building a better version.
For these forms of making we do not, therefore, use
the term ‘building’, but ‘controlling (in the sense of
steering)’ or ‘influencing’. We deem these latter
concepts more appropriate in such cases. We build
non-living matter; we influence organic life: micro-
organisms, plants, animals or humans.
The Recalcitrance of Life
The distinction between building and influencing is,
of course, gradual, not binary. There lies a continuum
of possibilities between the two. It is, however, not
coincidental that ‘building’ has so far chiefly been
associated with non-living and ‘influencing’ with
living matter. In actual fact, living organisms have a
particular way of resisting our attempts to subdue and
transform them. ‘Living’ can be defined as the
capacity to reproduce oneself. And that means that
those wishing to make living organisms, will be
competing with the organism itself. In such cases
there are two creators at the helm. Living beings that
become the object of control show a unique sort of
recalcitrance: a bacterium can become resistant to
antibiotics, animals that are bred for specific traits
sometimes become more prone to illnesses, our
children can dispute the correctness of our teachings.
The actorship of the organism in question is recog-
nized in the terms: influence and manipulation.
Whereas we can, as a rule, bend a non-living thing
to our will, we are far more likely to conclude a
compromise with a living organism.
Life as a do-it-yourself kit
It is precisely this fundamental dividing line that is
brought into focus and is problematized by converg-
ing technologies. For the first time it appears as
though the organic world is becoming makeable in
the sense that it can be designed and built [18]. The
computerization and miniaturization which form the
1 Our distinction between ‘building’ and ‘influencing’ is in the
background inspired by Hanna Arendt’s distinction between
‘work’ and ‘action’.[ 1] With ‘work’ she refers to the activity of
making objects, so it is more or less the same as technique or
technology. With ‘action’ she refers to shared deliberation and
acting. Action involves a relation between subjects. Our
concept of ‘building’ is akin to her concept of ‘work’, but
whereas Arendt restricts ‘action’ to inter-human relations, we
extend it — rechristened as ‘influencing’—to the relation
between humans and live organisms in general.
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significance of the distinction between non-living
and living, between passive and active. Organisms
are just as good carriers of information as software
packages or chemical substances. And on the nano-
scale, the whole thing is simply a matter of molecules
and chemical compounds, so that it is meaningless to
designate one molecular compound as ‘living’ and
another as ‘non-living’. As the Dutch professor of
molecular biophysics, Cees Dekker, put it in connection
with synthetic biology: “If you can produce an
independent, reproducing being from non-living build-
ing blocks (DNA, proteins, lipids) you can make life.
[…] Man has a certain control over both non-living and
living nature. There is no fundamental difference
between the two as far as I am concerned” [24]. Life
is molecular activity. The symbolic boundary between
non-living matter and living nature is blurring. Within
this new paradigm, nature is approached as a machine:
a moving whole, but composed of non-living parts.
We ourselves make up a prominent part of living
nature. The promise of the industrial revolution was
that all manner of processes would become more
makeable (faster, more efficient, larger scale). Lifeless
nature was increasingly seen as a collection of
‘natural resources’. Iron and coal were typical raw
materials for the industrial revolution. However, that
changed with the emergence of converging technolo-
gies. Merelman ([18], p. 179) shows how the emphasis
within science and technology gradually shifted from
‘external’ nature to ‘internal’ human nature: “Most
important, the post-modern focus on human life merely
extends the modernist attention to nature. Post-modern
technological culture simply treatshuman beingsas part
ofnature.”Indeed,notonlywillitbepossibletobuildor
rebuild the world around us, but also ourselves. The
central message behind converging technologies is
therefore that it will, in time, be possible to build people
themselves, as a part of our living nature.
In this way, our bodies, our brains and our social
world form the new raw materials. Technologies such
as genetics, neurology, pharmacology, medical tech-
nology and ICT mesh with our memory and our
personality, with human reproduction and our phys-
ical performances. The distinction between body and
mind is difficult to maintain in the light of recent
scientific and technical insights: everything about
living systems, ourselves included, is a product of
the interaction between molecules. Robot expert
Rodney Brooks ([3], p. 107) of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) brings this paradigm
shift into focus as follows: “The generalization facing
us is that we humans are machines, and as such,
subject to the same manipulation that we routinely
apply to machines.” NBIC convergence enables the
merging of artificial systems with our biological
systems.Inshort,wehavetodowitharadicalexpansion
of the building logic applied to non-living nature in the
direction of living nature. Regarded in this way, trans-
human enhancement is the culmination point of the
transition from controlling to building that is being
realized by converging technologies. If converging
technologies live up to their promise, the resistance of
living organisms will be broken. Even if this promise is
exceptionally speculative, this analysis at least gives an
indication of the visions that are currently serving as a
guide for a lot of research and technical developments.
Will it be increasingly possible for people to
unilaterally determine what in the past could only be
realized by negotiation and compromise? The articles
in this special issue give examples of such cases.
Whereas the development of new medicines is now
usually a matter of trial and error we will, if we are to
believe what the molecular biologists tell us, in the
near future be able to accurately determine what is
happening in a sick cell and build an effective
medicine for it with molecular technologies. The
modification of micro-organisms currently takes place
by smuggling a foreign gene in from the outside and
hoping for the best. But the Craig Venter Institute is
on the verge of building an artificial bacterium. This
first artificial form of life created by man has already
been nicknamed Synthia, as a humorous reference to
Dolly, by the environmental organizations. The
enhancement of plants and animals is still taking
place by crossing, and then just hoping that some-
thing useful will be produced. In the long term we
should, thanks to synthetic biology, be able to build
plants and animals to order and according to a
specific design. As a result of persuasive technology
we will no longer have to trust to the power of weak
arguments, or to our even weaker ‘better self’;b y
means of a shortcut we will immediately be able to
steer our behaviour effectively in the desired direc-
tion. And if persuasive technology fails after all,
thanks to converging technologies we will be able to
intervene directly in our brains to switch on or off the
required connections.
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Converging technologies will enable us to realize
existing objectives faster, more directly, effectively,
easily, comprehensively and often more invisibly than
previously possible. For the time being, however, they
do not appear to differ all that much from the already
established (social) technologies as regards effective-
ness. Insisting that someone do something or impos-
ing a fine on him or her, will frequently be at least as
effective as an educational mirror or telephone.
Controlling someone’s behaviour by inserting electro-
des in his or her brain will not always be more
effective than giving them a pill. We do not have to
have synthetic biology at our disposal to make
sweeping modifications in living organisms to suit
our economic requirements. And we do not have to
discover implantable nanosensors to become health-
obsessed hypochondriacs. In other words: as long as
converging technologies are still in their infancy,
‘building’ may not always be more effective or more
radical than ‘controlling’ or ‘tinkering’.
However, this justifiable qualification does not alter
the radical character of the paradigm shift we have
spotted. Both forms of making — that is controlling
versus building — imply a fundamentally different
relationship between humans and reality. Thanks to
converging technologies, a form of making that has so
far remained restricted to our interventions in the
domain of non-living nature, has now expanded to
include the domain of living nature, ourselves included.
Emerging Boundary Conflicts
‘Building’ and ‘controlling/steering’ entail two fun-
damentally different relationships with reality. This
difference can be seen as the difference between the
objectifying and the social perspective on reality. If
the boundary between these two perspectives can no
longer be clearly drawn, this will lead to a great deal
of moral uneasiness. There are two reasons for this.
Conflicting Perspectives
People apply two fundamentally different perspec-
tives to outside reality [10, 26]. On the basis of the
objectifying perspective the world appears as a total of
facts. We know, for example, that our partner consists
of molecules and chemical processes, and we would
like the doctor to see him or her like that too. In fact,
this objectifying manner of looking at things leads to
scientific knowledge and technical solutions — an
effective medicine, for example. However, we have
also learned that the scientific, objectifying view of
the world is not a universal panacea. This is why we
also apply a social perspective that sees the world as a
whole comprising norms, values and meanings. As a
rule, we naturally see our partner on the basis of this
social perspective, and the doctor has to be able to do
the same. We can view animals, and even plants,
using this social perspective. The essence of this
perspective is the abovementioned acknowledgement
of the independent actorship of living organisms.
We are generally able to apply both perspectives side
by side. In most situations we intuitively know the
appropriate way to view things. And if not, there are
strict rules and prohibitions, or taboos, to define a sharp
boundary between the two perspectives. Kant’sb a no n
viewing our fellow man purely as an instrument serves
as a good example here [12]. Sometimes, however,
there is no consensus as to whether the objectifying or
the social view is preferable. This throws up social
controversies that often go exceptionally deep and are
correspondingly difficult to solve, such as the dis-
cussion on preimplantation genetic diagnostics. Are the
embryos involved ‘lumps of cells’ or ‘tiny people’?
These two mutually exclusive ways of looking at
things are ethically charged because they lay down
those options that are morally acceptable and those that
are not. If converging technologies now enable us to
ignore the actorship of living organisms unpunished,
the basic experience forming the reason for existence
of the respect underlying the social perspective threat-
ens to disappear. The taboos that currently still
safeguard the boundary between the objectifying and
the social perspectives will, as a result, be subjected to
increasing pressure.
Evaporating Taboos
Let us give an example. Seen from the social
perspective, one may only influence the opinions and
behaviour of others by trying to persuade them of one’s
own way of thinking — out of respect for the other’s
autonomy. In the Netherlands as recently as the
nineteen seventies, a criminologist called Buikhuisen
was ostracized from the circle of right-minded,
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connection between psychological traits and biological
characteristics. After all, this smacked of racism or
sexism: groups were stigmatized and social inequal-
ities were justified with a reference to presupposed
biological differences [5]. Nowadays, however, re-
search of this type is again taking place — without
opposition. Geneticists and cognitive scientists have
already demonstrated that many of our traits and
behaviours indeed have a genetic or biological
component. In theory, through computerization and
miniaturization, psychological traits are now also
within reach of technological and biotechnological
intervention. Scientists freely investigate how our
thoughts and actions can be controlled by technology:
directly by means of chemical or electronic methods,
or indirectly with the aid of persuasive technology.
Here we see how ‘making’ takes over from ‘steering’.
After all, such research assumes a way of looking at
our process of weighing up a situation in which the
definition or determinability of our thinking is central
rather than our freedom, autonomy and rationality. We
do not fully realize it, but an important taboo is being
broken here. And in a sense, the step currently being
taken is more radical than that of Buikhuisen.
Whereas he was only interested in the criminal mind,
these days it is all about ‘building’ everybody’s mind.
The Norm of ‘Naturalness’: as Impossible
as it is Inevitable
The makeability of life fascinates us, but it instantly
arouses moral uneasiness and opposition at the same
time. This not only has to do with the object of our
aims, but also with our own situation as builders.
The fact that matters going in a certain way does
not mean that they have to go that way was already
brought to our attention more than four centuries ago.
The Age of Reason sought its mission in conquering
nature and we have all been more or less formed by
that pursuit. It took the requisite time and seculariza-
tion before the insight that nature is no longer the
norm became widely accepted. Nature, as the adage
has gone since then, does not contain any ethical
behavioural instructions. According to science, the
world as it is, including man himself, is not based on
a plan, but is purely coincidental. Nothing is as it
must be; in theory everything is capable of improve-
ment. And we are still implementing that programme.
We therefore no longer live in a biotope, but in a
technotope. Our world has been made by people and
often that is a good thing too. Becoming sick is a very
natural thing to do, but we still fight it tooth and nail.
And yet.... Nature, both external and internal, keeps
cropping us as the norm. We want to live naturally, go
back to nature, respect and conserve nature, deal
naturally with one another, eat naturally and so on.
The emergence of converging technologies and, in
particular, the technological visions driving this con-
vergence on, also make us realize the extent to which,
as yet, our morality has been founded on all sorts of
notions of human nature, for example that people aim
for happiness and want to avoid pain, or that we are
naturally connected to the fate of our fellows, or some
of them — or more broadly, with our fellow creatures.
Is the longing for ‘naturalness’ only a reflex in
response to a stimulus? Or are we dealing with
expressions of a deeper-lying need that is indeed
worth taking seriously? In our opinion, the need for
‘naturalness’ does not necessarily indicate a longing
for a pre-modern, pre-technological age. The contem-
porary need for naturalness can be better understood
as a response to the fact that technology makes reality
more and more makeable and, consequently, more
contingent. Advancing technology changes every-
thing that is into an object of our choice: it is like
this or that, but does it have to be like this or that? We
can choose. And that is often fantastic, as we have
already said. But what are we supposed to base
benchmarks and guidelines on in such a completely
conditional, coincidental universe? If human nature
itself becomes makeable, it can no longer naively be
laid down as the norm. The classical adage of
Enlightenment ‘Man is the measure of all things’
loses all meaning. And if we are no longer able to
refer to a given human nature, how do we then
determine what we should and should not ‘build’?I f
we could make everything, wouldn’te v e r y t h i n g
become meaningless and wouldn’t we end up in a
moral vacuum as a result?
Opposition to Perfect Control
The makeability of life raises opposition and uneas-
iness for another reason too. Once we can mould
nature completely to our will, the relationship we
have with it ceases to exist. For example: however
much we sometimes wish that our partner fulfilled
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perfectly-programmable love robot. Recalcitrance is a
part of every healthy relationship. We have just as
much need of opposition as we have need to
overcome it. This need is at the root of our fear of a
world without resistance, that may not perhaps entail
the risk of sorrow, loss, humiliation and defeat, but no
longer has any happiness, gratitude, satisfaction or
surprises in store for us either.
The best known example of the aversion aroused
by the perfect control of man and world, is that in
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932). In this
novel, Huxley evokes the image of a world in which
everything and everyone is brought under total
control. He creates a situation in which everyone has
enough to eat and is happy, healthy and always
cheerful. And yet, or perhaps because of it, it is a
daunting world — although in our liberal culture we
no longer have the ethical vocabulary to describe
precisely what it is about this picture that is so
daunting [8, 13]. The novel expresses something that
cannot be translated in terms of the accepted moral
coinage of not-harming, doing good, autonomy and
justice. In fact, it confronts us with the metaphysical
loneliness of the human who only meets his mirror
image everywhere: a world that obediently yields to
all our wishes and desires; a world with which a
meaningful relationship cannot be concluded because
it no longer offers any resistance. If we can make
anything and do not have to accept anything, life
loses its meaning and beauty. That is the underlying
fear that overcomes many of us when we contemplate
a world without resistance in which everything,
including who we are as humans, has become the
object of human intervention.
This need of opposition is a major reason why the
discussion on ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ is constantly
resurrected. Many people, for example, prefer to see
having children as a natural part of life rather than as
a part of a life plan, and want to accept a child with all
his or her unexpected characteristics, instead of
designing the ideal one. Nature is still the symbol of
that over which we have no control, that which
overcomes us and to which we have to relate. And the
fact that there is a grey zone here (perhaps we will, for
example, want to prevent children with severe handi-
caps from having to live) does not detract from the
fundamental experience that many people do not want
to be able to control everything [23].
Making and Accepting
On the basis of the history of technological
development, it is to be expected that the logic of
building the organic world will not spread without
resistance. The fears and considerations described
above will certainly play up. Converging technolo-
gies create ‘boundary conflicts’ between the objec-
tifying and social perspectives and appear not to be
at all concerned about the taboos monitoring this
boundary. This will lead to considerable social
unrest and the reaction to converging technologies
will, as a result, be much fiercer than one would
expect on the basis of the directly perceptible
consequences. Policymakers can, at least, prepare
for this. The big question will subsequently be how
this development can be supervised by society.
There are no cut-and-dried answers to this question,
even if this special issue does provide a perspective
on the importance of the development and provides
handles for dealing with the proliferation of the
logic of building the organic world and keeping it
within bounds.
The Industrial Revolution as Source of Inspiration
We can derive inspiration and understanding from
developments in the past. In the course of time, the
industrial revolution entailed countless changes,
challenges and problems. It coincided with the
emergence of the machine, the city, science, big
companies and also, last but not least, democracy.
Its birth was accompanied by violent social, eco-
nomic, ideological and political strife (capitalism,
anarchism, Marxism, socialism, etc), which has
determined a significant part of our political agenda
up to the present day. It was only in the nineteen
sixties that the realization finally dawned on a wider
audience that this building logic had enormous
repercussions for nature: nature was scarce and
resources finite. Depletion of the environment
threatened to make the pursuit of control over it
impossible.
From that point in time, nature conservation
became an important political issue, but the problems,
from the depletion of fossil fuels to water shortages,
soot emissions from diesel trucks and climate change,
seem to increase by the day, precisely because we
have been so late in realizing the danger.
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The first thing this period in history has taught us is
that it is better if we can anticipate the drawbacks of
the logic implicated in new technology in good time.
Otherwise the problems will be much more difficult
to fix. The second lesson is more substantive.
Comparison with the industrial revolution shows that
the information revolution adds a third political
dimension to the two mentioned above: besides the
struggle between work and capital and the fight for
the environment, we now encounter fights at the
levels of biopolitics and bioethics (see, for example,
[11]). The industrial revolution has resulted in ideals
such as economic justice and sustainability being
given a prominent place on the political agenda. This
raises the question of what ideals can provide a
framework when it comes to the technological design
of living beings, ourselves included.
If we intuitively recoil from the comprehensive
application of the building logic to living beings, we
will have to give adequate shape to this question. In
the light of the promise of NBIC convergence,
‘human nature’ is probably too static or too biased
(because it is inherently conservative) to function as
an ideal [4]. After all, for some, this human nature
forms a point of departure rather than a boundary that
hastoberespected.Aframeworkcanthereforebefound
in joining up with the existing concept of sustainability.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the vagueness of this
concept, it has led to a productive discourse that has
modified the ideals of the industrial revolution and
stimulated the discussion on the direction of (sustain-
able) innovation. It provides a counterbalance for our
drive to control, or rather: the concept of sustainability
steersandassiststhewayinwhichwedealwithexternal
nature. Sustainability requires precision and a certain
restraint too, because otherwise depletion and even the
extinction of our natural resources are lying in wait.
Now that we ourselves are increasingly becoming the
object of research and technological intervention, we
need ‘human sustainability’ [29].
Making and Accepting
The essence of a sustainability concept that has been
expanded in this way should be formed by joint
reflection on the question: what is makeable and what
should simply be accepted? Converging technologies
will lead to controversies around the currently still
accepted dividing line between the objectifying and
the social perspectives. The aim of these controversies
is ultimately to define what is human and where the
boundary between building and influencing should be
drawn. Put another way: what should we accept or
respect as given, and what may we deem changeable
[7]? Human sustainability will not be possible unless
we reflect on and deal with the tension evoked by
technological progress in general and by converging
technologies in particular. It is precisely this dialectic
between makeability on the one hand and the need for
opposition on the other that, according to the articles
in this special issue, crystallizes out around the
technological convergences discussed. It is unlikely
that it will ever be settled. There is probably little else
for us to do than to continue the discussion.
Double Dynamics
Converging technologies entail a certain double
dynamics: destabilization of concepts that serve as a
guide, and subsequently their new interpretation in the
light of the changed circumstances. The technoscien-
tific developments discussed in this special issue:
brain-machine interaction, ambient intelligence and
persuasive technology, molecular medicine, and syn-
thetic biology, all show the abovementioned double
dynamics: key concepts are retained, but their
meaning and practical details are under dispute and
can shift. In conclusion, we list those central
categorizing concepts that will have to be rediscov-
ered as a result of the various developments and how
the discrepancy between ‘making’ and ‘accepting’
continues to pervade this discussion (see also Table 1).
Brain-Machine Interaction
In developments in the field of brain-machine interac-
tion it is the key concepts of body and person that are at
issue. One of the questions that have emerged as a
result is: what defines a body? The underlying moral
question here concerns the degree to which a body
deserves protection. Schermer wonders whether we
should perhaps see body prostheses, from artificial
arms to cochlear implants, as parts of the body. A
technologically-inspired symbolic expansion of the
concept of body like this would, of course, have
276 Nanoethics (2009) 3:269–280consequences for policy and legislation. Schermer is
also of the opinion that there is a need for a graduated
or differentiated concept of a ‘person’. Developments
in the field of the brain sciences and artificial
intelligence also require reflection on the concept of
person and issues such as liability, responsibility and
worthiness of protection. Consider, for example,
autonomic robots, avatars and exoskeletons.
The possibility of technology being used to manip-
ulate personality and will lurks in the background here.
If we extrapolate the abovementioned makeability in
our mind’s eye, at the end we see the extreme of a
person whose experience and will are determined
totally by external factors. We can imagine how these
people could be completely happy — in accordance
with the (implicit) adage of Brave New World: ‘you
want what you can have, and what you cannot have
you do not want’. Authenticity loses all meaning in
this situation; perhaps even the concept ‘person’ does
too. The opposite of this extreme is to embrace human
imperfections and shortcomings on the basis of the
assumption that our humanity is to be found in the
way we deal with these imperfections and short-
comings and give them meaning. Technology itself is,
however, one of the most impressive ways of dealing
with them — in fact by correcting or compensating
for them. There is a lot of human greatness in this
pursuit. Only the problem is that, at the same time, we
seem to hope that we will ultimately lose the fight
because a total victory would negate our humanity. In
the case of brain-machine interaction the important
thing is therefore to find a new, precarious balance
between building and controlling or accepting.
Ambient Intelligence and Persuasive Technology
Ambient intelligence and persuasive technology raise
similar questions. The key symbolic concept here is
‘actor’. Responsibility and freedom are the important
moral issues involved. What we always had to accept
as given, was the fact that people do not always do
the right thing, because they are bad or because they
are weak willed. The idea underlying persuasive
technology is that neither has to be accepted any
more, but that they can be corrected by technical
means. However, the price we have to pay for this is
the loss of our humanity. This is why the ideal of
human sustainability compels us to rethink the
balance between freedom (with all its advantages
and disadvantages) and definition or determinability
(with all its advantages and disadvantages). That is
precisely what Verbeek advocates.
The term ‘actor’ is usually understood to refer to
people: an individual, group or organization that
carries out an action. Verbeek indicates that, because
of developments in the field of IT, the concept ‘actor’
should perhaps be expanded with things or machines.
He suggests a subtle expansion: that from now on we
have to look very consciously at the interaction
between man and machine. That applies to designers
and policymakers, but also to users. The way in which
an individual can still be held responsible can be
judged on the specific technological context. In a
situation in which technology imposes compulsory
behaviour on a certain person, there can be no
question of that person being liable. We therefore
have to be aware of what we are dealing with in the
Table 1 The relationship between emerging technologies and key symbolic concepts
Scientific and technological development Key symbolic concept Expansion or reduction of key concept
Brain-machine interaction Body / physical integrity Technology as integrated component of the body
Person Person extends beyond the body (remote control, avatars)
Robot (machine as ‘autonomic’ actor)
Ambient Intelligence / Persuasive
technology
Actor Machine as responsible actor, or rather, human in interaction
with technology as actor
Molecular medicine Healthy or sick Illness as a molecular process that may vary for each individual
Non-sick patient
Synthetic biology Living and non-living Life as an information-processing system (reduction)
Material and
informational
Copying life on the basis of a code
Natural and artificial New forms of life
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tions of freedom and responsibility that are somewhat
analogous to Schermer’s graduated concept of ‘per-
son’. Instruments such as ‘informed consent’ and
possibilities for ‘opt-outs’ may help in clarifying the
apportioning of responsibility in certain circumstances
and combating abuse. Besides matters concerning
privacy, numerous political questions also play a role
here, such as where the boundaries lie between public,
commercial and private domains.
Molecular Medicine
Molecular medicine sees the body as a system
consisting of components. It is based on the assump-
tion that you can control the body by controlling the
separate components and promises us a completely
transparent body. According to Boenink, this view
undermines existing approaches to the body that
entail a non-transparent, organic, holistic whole with
its own developmental story that is to be respected. In
this case, the objectifying view of the doctor conflicts
with the physical experiences of the patient him or
herself. According to the one the body can be sick,
but according to the other there is no problem as yet.
As regards the key concept ‘sick’, converging
technologies force us to re-examine the question of
when one is sick and the meaning of illness. The
emergence of molecular medicine changes the mean-
ing of being sick. This perspective, particularly if this
scientific image becomes successful in practice,
generates a different interpretation of the concept: it
is no longer primarily connected to visible symptoms
of illness but is deemed a phenomenon at the
molecular level. Molecular medicine therefore raises
the question of whether we must follow different
molecular processes and manipulate them where
possible, or not.
Molecular medicine uses what are known as
biomarkers to signal biochemical changes at the
molecular level and, by doing so, diagnose or predict
illness in good time. This view of illness (illness as
cascade) is also already visible in current trends for
predicting and preventing illness early on. This does
not alter the fact that it raises numerous questions.
How do you deal with the knowledge that, in time,
you will develop complaints? How do you deal with
the uncertainties that such knowledge often throws
up? A new, modified interpretation of the symbolic
key concept ‘sick’ will have to be developed. This
could take place in various ways. The concept can, for
example, be broadened so that we can use the term
‘sick’ when it has been ascertained that something is
going wrong on the molecular level. But it is also
possible that we will differentiate the concept, for
example by speaking of a patient being ‘symptomat-
ically sick’ and ‘pre-symptomatically sick’. Finally,
the concept can also be restricted in meaning by, for
example, reserving it only for cases in which clearly-
observable symptoms occur. The route chosen will, in
turn, have consequences for policy and legislation.
As a result of shifts of this kind, the healthcare
system can take on radically new characteristics. And
in the background there will always be the question
of: when do we intervene? On the basis of the human
sustainability perspective, where is the boundary
between accept and intervene? What applies as
natural variation and what as a deviation that is to
be remedied? What do we have to live with, or learn
to live with, and what should be rectified?
Synthetic Biology
Finally, synthetic biology raises the question of what
life is. Van den Belt indicates that the scientific world
increasingly describes life as a self-reproducing,
information-processing system. This vision of life
has already penetrated into the European patent law,
where ‘biological material’ is defined as ‘material that
contains genetic information and can replicate itself or
can be replicated in a biological system’. Van den Belt
calls this ‘the computerization of life’. Computeriza-
tion has already been going on for decades but
synthetic biology forms a significant step in that it
adds the ideal of ‘building’ to this development. Seen
from this perspective, the organism is a code that can
be rewritten, or a machine that can be reprogrammed.
The computerization of life not only diminishes the
definition of life, but also ensures its expansion at the
same time. New forms of life, including artificial
ones, lie in store for us. Many of them will have
useful applications, but some may not. This throws up
a new challenge for the opponents of bioterrorism.
But the reductionistic vision used by scientists
clashes regularly with (as yet) accepted visions on
life. The perspective of synthetic biology is at odds
with that of the acceptance of life as it comes, of
being grateful for the arrival of children instead of
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the cheerful embracing of ‘handicapped’ life because
it is just one of those things, of respect for the
sanctity of life. If synthetic biology lives up to
expectations, will there still be scope for the
fundamental human experience of being surprised
by unintended forms of life? And if we are allowed to
make bacteria, will we be allowed to do the same
with people? And if not, on what grounds would such
a prohibition be based if the message of synthetic
biology is that organisms are the result of pure
coincidence and can therefore be revised and im-
proved? Is the patenting of life ethically responsible
or does objectification go too far in this case? Or
should we no longer take such respect seriously and
deem it a reflex from the era of ignorance of the
molecular processes that make the difference between
living and non-living matter?
Conclusion
With this special issue we have attempted to offer a
philosophical perspective on the broad emergence of
NBIC convergence: the new technological wave. A
perspective of this kind is useful in this early phase as
it anticipates and draws attention to existing and
possible emergent problems.
We have shown that NBIC convergence is founded
on a fundamental paradigm shift. As a result of
convergence, a form of making that has so far been
limited to our interventions in the domain of non-
living nature is expanding into the domain of living
nature, ourselves included. Because of this, the
fundamental symbolic distinction between non-living
matter and living organisms is blurring. Our experi-
ence with the negative consequences of industrializa-
tion for the environment and familiar dystopias such
as those described in Brave New World clearly show
that practically no one will benefit from the introduc-
tion of this building logic in its entirety.
This is why reflection on the building logic with
respect to life and debate on its boundaries are so
important. Various authors therefore argue that bio-
political issues will form an increasingly important
dimension in the political debate as a result of NBIC
convergence [11, 21, 28]. In this way, NBIC
convergence forms a potentially ‘rich’ source of
social uneasiness and political points of difference.
To make matters more complex, this reflection also
has simultaneously to deal with the modern experi-
ence that things are fundamentally out of control. It is
an interesting observation that the discourse of
‘making nature’ is accompanied with a counter-
discourse that states that society is not makeable. In
policy literature, to take an example, the idea of a
centre governing the rest of society has been
substituted by the idea of governance, which is much
more akin to ‘influencing’ and ‘compromising with’
organisms. Similarly, technology itself is often per-
ceived as unmakeable. And even those who think
otherwise, usually will refrain from arguing that we
can control technological developments. At most we
can exert a certain pressure. Again, this is much closer
to ‘influencing’ than to ‘building’.
This special issue touches on numerous existing,
emergent and possible future ‘ultra-untameable’ prob-
lems or boundary conflicts. Technology that is
gradually taking on the traits normally associated
with a (moral) actor, in the form of autonomic robots,
artificial life and so on, is challenging policy more
and more. Often there is a clash between existing
social logic (norms and values and the related
conceptual frameworks) and the scientific and tech-
nological building logic of converging technologies.
These clashes can invoke fierce reactions because
building logic often affects taboos connected with
contemporary self awareness. Human sustainability
appears to be under pressure. At every clash, we will
have to examine the extent to which it is desirable and
possible to incorporate the new logic into existing
practices.
Important symbolic classifications are therefore on
the line. The reduction, expansion, gradation and
differentiation of important concepts such as body,
life, person and illness converge here. Reductionism
is the driving force behind much science and
technology. Expansion and differentiation are ways
to embed scientific developments in social practices.
Human values such as freedom, equality, the possi-
bility of taking responsibility, the right not to know
and so on are central to that process.
The socialization of scientific findings does not,
however, take place automatically. It is precisely
because converging technologies unsettle various cen-
tral symbolic classifications, that it is important that we
are aware of what we are dealing with in the case of
public investments and the concepts implicated. This
Nanoethics (2009) 3:269–280 279necessitates the constant involvement of policymakers,
politicians and social groups. In order not to become
swamped by the new technological wave, the debate on
the significance of these developments and the best
ways to steer them in the right direction must be
continually stimulated.
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